openssl: Fix memory leak in read_rsa_bignums().

[paraslash.git] / user_list.c

diff --git a/user_list.c b/user_list.c
index d54b619a2d58ef98519f83bd3a88dd331be447b6..32a4309d4360fa73a8e7d0bbef622a7928001bb0 100644 (file)
--- a/user_list.c
+++ b/user_list.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void user_list_deplete(void)
        list_for_each_entry_safe(u, tmpu, &user_list, node) {
                list_del(&u->node);
                free(u->name);
        list_for_each_entry_safe(u, tmpu, &user_list, node) {
                list_del(&u->node);
                free(u->name);

-               free_public_key(u->pubkey);
+               apc_free_pubkey(u->pubkey);

                free(u);
        }
 }
                free(u);
        }
 }


@@ -92,22 +92,22 @@ void user_list_init(const char *user_list_file)
                if (strcmp(w, "user"))
                        continue;
                PARA_DEBUG_LOG("found entry for user %s\n", n);
                if (strcmp(w, "user"))
                        continue;
                PARA_DEBUG_LOG("found entry for user %s\n", n);

-               ret = get_public_key(k, &pubkey);
+               ret = apc_get_pubkey(k, &pubkey);

                if (ret < 0) {
                        PARA_NOTICE_LOG("skipping entry for user %s: %s\n", n,
                                para_strerror(-ret));
                        continue;
                }
                /*
                if (ret < 0) {
                        PARA_NOTICE_LOG("skipping entry for user %s: %s\n", n,
                                para_strerror(-ret));
                        continue;
                }
                /*

-                * In order to encrypt len := CHALLENGE_SIZE + 2 * SESSION_KEY_LEN
+                * In order to encrypt len := APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE + 2 * SESSION_KEY_LEN

                 * bytes using RSA_public_encrypt() with EME-OAEP padding mode,
                 * RSA_size(rsa) must be greater than len + 41. So ignore keys
                 * which are too short. For details see RSA_public_encrypt(3).
                 */
                 * bytes using RSA_public_encrypt() with EME-OAEP padding mode,
                 * RSA_size(rsa) must be greater than len + 41. So ignore keys
                 * which are too short. For details see RSA_public_encrypt(3).
                 */

-               if (ret <= CHALLENGE_SIZE + 2 * SESSION_KEY_LEN + 41) {
+               if (ret <= APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE + 2 * SESSION_KEY_LEN + 41) {

                        PARA_WARNING_LOG("public key %s too short (%d)\n",
                                k, ret);
                        PARA_WARNING_LOG("public key %s too short (%d)\n",
                                k, ret);

-                       free_public_key(pubkey);
+                       apc_free_pubkey(pubkey);

                        continue;
                }
                u = para_malloc(sizeof(*u));
                        continue;
                }
                u = para_malloc(sizeof(*u));