X-Git-Url: http://git.tuebingen.mpg.de/?p=paraslash.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=command.c;h=8ea725de7898ef817a62c0ba2755c73a0f744572;hp=6568b789339b25125fd54fad90d03abeceb515a2;hb=62c0894fbb589dd45e69b7d9ef1fd152a9960d62;hpb=c517cb88ae745c9be06ac5cd99236c4bae8575c9 diff --git a/command.c b/command.c index 6568b789..8ea725de 100644 --- a/command.c +++ b/command.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "server.lsg.h" #include "para.h" #include "error.h" +#include "lsu.h" #include "crypt.h" #include "sideband.h" #include "command.h" @@ -48,11 +49,15 @@ static const char * const server_command_perms_txt[] = {LSG_SERVER_CMD_AUX_INFOS extern int mmd_mutex; extern struct misc_meta_data *mmd; -extern struct sender senders[]; int send_afs_status(struct command_context *cc, int parser_friendly); +static bool subcmd_should_die; -static void dummy(__a_unused int s) +static void command_handler_sighandler(int s) { + if (s != SIGTERM) + return; + PARA_EMERG_LOG("terminating on signal %d\n", SIGTERM); + subcmd_should_die = true; } /* @@ -235,10 +240,10 @@ static int check_sender_args(struct command_context *cc, return ret; } arg = lls_input(0, lpr); - for (i = 0; senders[i].name; i++) - if (!strcmp(senders[i].name, arg)) + FOR_EACH_SENDER(i) + if (strcmp(senders[i]->name, arg) == 0) break; - if (!senders[i].name) + if (!senders[i]) return -E_COMMAND_SYNTAX; scd->sender_num = i; arg = lls_input(1, lpr); @@ -248,7 +253,7 @@ static int check_sender_args(struct command_context *cc, if (i == NUM_SENDER_CMDS) return -E_COMMAND_SYNTAX; scd->cmd_num = i; - if (!senders[scd->sender_num].client_cmds[scd->cmd_num]) + if (!senders[scd->sender_num]->client_cmds[scd->cmd_num]) return -E_SENDER_CMD; switch (scd->cmd_num) { case SENDER_on: @@ -274,7 +279,7 @@ static int check_sender_args(struct command_context *cc, } /** - * Send a sideband packet through a blocking file descriptor. + * Receive a sideband packet from a blocking file descriptor. * * \param scc fd and crypto keys. * \param expected_band The expected band designator. @@ -330,10 +335,10 @@ static int com_sender(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) struct sender_command_data scd; if (lls_num_inputs(lpr) == 0) { - for (i = 0; senders[i].name; i++) { + FOR_EACH_SENDER(i) { char *tmp; ret = xasprintf(&tmp, "%s%s\n", msg? msg : "", - senders[i].name); + senders[i]->name); free(msg); msg = tmp; } @@ -344,17 +349,17 @@ static int com_sender(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) if (scd.sender_num < 0) return ret; if (strcmp(lls_input(1, lpr), "status") == 0) - msg = senders[scd.sender_num].status(); + msg = senders[scd.sender_num]->status(); else - msg = senders[scd.sender_num].help(); + msg = senders[scd.sender_num]->help(); return send_sb(&cc->scc, msg, strlen(msg), SBD_OUTPUT, false); } switch (scd.cmd_num) { case SENDER_add: case SENDER_delete: - assert(senders[scd.sender_num].resolve_target); - ret = senders[scd.sender_num].resolve_target(lls_input(2, lpr), + assert(senders[scd.sender_num]->resolve_target); + ret = senders[scd.sender_num]->resolve_target(lls_input(2, lpr), &scd); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -452,6 +457,7 @@ EXPORT_SERVER_CMD_HANDLER(version); ITEM(chunk_time) \ ITEM(num_chunks) \ ITEM(amplification) \ + ITEM(play_time) \ /* * Create a set of audio-file related status items with empty values. These are @@ -493,9 +499,21 @@ static int com_stat(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) bool parser_friendly = SERVER_CMD_OPT_GIVEN(STAT, PARSER_FRIENDLY, lpr) > 0; uint32_t num = SERVER_CMD_UINT32_VAL(STAT, NUM, lpr); + const struct timespec ts = {.tv_sec = 50, .tv_nsec = 0}; - para_sigaction(SIGUSR1, dummy); + para_sigaction(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + para_sigaction(SIGUSR1, command_handler_sighandler); + para_sigaction(SIGTERM, command_handler_sighandler); + /* + * Simply checking subcmd_should_die is racy because a signal may + * arrive after the check but before the subsequent call to sleep(3). + * If this happens, sleep(3) would not be interrupted by the signal. + * To avoid this we block SIGTERM here and allow it to arrive only + * while we sleep. + */ + para_block_signal(SIGTERM); for (;;) { + sigset_t set; /* * Copy the mmd structure to minimize the time we hold the mmd * lock. @@ -518,7 +536,15 @@ static int com_stat(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) ret = 1; if (num > 0 && !--num) goto out; - sleep(50); + sigemptyset(&set); /* empty set means: unblock all signals */ + /* + * pselect(2) allows to atomically unblock signals, then go to + * sleep. Calling sigprocmask(2) followed by sleep(3) would + * open a race window similar to the one described above. + */ + pselect(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ts, &set); + if (subcmd_should_die) + goto out; ret = -E_SERVER_CRASH; if (getppid() == 1) goto out; @@ -528,63 +554,35 @@ out: } EXPORT_SERVER_CMD_HANDLER(stat); -/* fixed-length, human readable permission string */ -const char *server_cmd_perms_str(unsigned int perms) +const char *aux_info_cb(unsigned cmd_num, bool verbose) { - static char result[5]; + static char result[80]; + unsigned perms = server_command_perms[cmd_num]; - result[0] = perms & AFS_READ? 'a' : '-'; - result[1] = perms & AFS_WRITE? 'A' : '-'; - result[2] = perms & VSS_READ? 'v' : '-'; - result[3] = perms & VSS_WRITE? 'V' : '-'; - result[4] = '\0'; - return result; -} - -static int send_list_of_commands(struct command_context *cc) -{ - int i; - const struct lls_command *cmd; - char *msg = para_strdup(""); - - for (i = 1; (cmd = lls_cmd(i, server_cmd_suite)); i++) { - const char *perms = server_cmd_perms_str(server_command_perms[i]); - char *tmp = make_message("%s%s\t%s\t%s\n", msg, - lls_command_name(cmd), perms, lls_purpose(cmd)); - free(msg); - msg = tmp; + if (verbose) { + /* permissions: VSS_READ | VSS_WRITE */ + sprintf(result, "permissions: %s", + server_command_perms_txt[cmd_num]); + } else { + result[0] = perms & AFS_READ? 'a' : '-'; + result[1] = perms & AFS_WRITE? 'A' : '-'; + result[2] = perms & VSS_READ? 'v' : '-'; + result[3] = perms & VSS_WRITE? 'V' : '-'; + result[4] = '\0'; } - return send_sb(&cc->scc, msg, strlen(msg), SBD_OUTPUT, false); + return result; } static int com_help(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) { - const char *perms; - char *long_help, *buf, *errctx; + char *buf; int ret; - const struct lls_command *cmd; + unsigned n; + bool long_help = SERVER_CMD_OPT_GIVEN(HELP, LONG, lpr); - ret = lls(lls_check_arg_count(lpr, 0, 1, &errctx)); - if (ret < 0) { - send_errctx(cc, errctx); - return ret; - } - if (lls_num_inputs(lpr) == 0) - return send_list_of_commands(cc); - /* argument given for help */ - ret = lls(lls_lookup_subcmd(lls_input(0, lpr), server_cmd_suite, - &errctx)); - if (ret < 0) { - send_errctx(cc, errctx); - return ret; - } - cmd = lls_cmd(ret, server_cmd_suite); - perms = server_command_perms_txt[ret]; - long_help = lls_long_help(cmd); - assert(long_help); - ret = xasprintf(&buf, "%spermissions: %s\n", long_help, perms); - free(long_help); - return send_sb(&cc->scc, buf, ret, SBD_OUTPUT, false); + lsu_com_help(long_help, lpr, server_cmd_suite, aux_info_cb, &buf, &n); + ret = send_sb(&cc->scc, buf, n, SBD_OUTPUT, false); + return ret; } EXPORT_SERVER_CMD_HANDLER(help); @@ -663,12 +661,10 @@ static int com_nomore(__a_unused struct command_context *cc, } EXPORT_SERVER_CMD_HANDLER(nomore); -static int com_ff(__a_unused struct command_context *cc, - struct lls_parse_result *lpr) +static int com_ff(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) { long promille; - int ret, backwards = 0; - unsigned i; + int i, ret; char c, *errctx; ret = lls(lls_check_arg_count(lpr, 1, 1, &errctx)); @@ -676,19 +672,33 @@ static int com_ff(__a_unused struct command_context *cc, send_errctx(cc, errctx); return ret; } - if (!(ret = sscanf(lls_input(0, lpr), "%u%c", &i, &c))) - return -E_COMMAND_SYNTAX; - if (ret > 1 && c == '-') - backwards = 1; /* jmp backwards */ + ret = para_atoi32(lls_input(0, lpr), &i); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret != -E_ATOI_JUNK_AT_END) + return ret; + /* + * Compatibility code to keep the historic syntax (ff 30-) + * working. This can be removed after 0.7.0. + */ + ret = sscanf(lls_input(0, lpr), "%i%c", &i, &c); + if (ret <= 0) + return -E_COMMAND_SYNTAX; + if (ret > 1 && c == '-') { + PARA_WARNING_LOG("use of obsolete syntax\n"); + i = -i; + } + } mutex_lock(mmd_mutex); ret = -E_NO_AUDIO_FILE; if (!mmd->afd.afhi.chunks_total || !mmd->afd.afhi.seconds_total) goto out; + ret = 1; promille = (1000 * mmd->current_chunk) / mmd->afd.afhi.chunks_total; - if (backwards) - promille -= 1000 * i / mmd->afd.afhi.seconds_total; - else - promille += 1000 * i / mmd->afd.afhi.seconds_total; + /* + * We need this cast because without it the expression on the right + * hand side is of unsigned type. + */ + promille += 1000 * i / (int)mmd->afd.afhi.seconds_total; if (promille < 0) promille = 0; if (promille > 1000) { @@ -699,15 +709,13 @@ static int com_ff(__a_unused struct command_context *cc, mmd->new_vss_status_flags |= VSS_REPOS; mmd->new_vss_status_flags &= ~VSS_NEXT; mmd->events++; - ret = 1; out: mutex_unlock(mmd_mutex); return ret; } EXPORT_SERVER_CMD_HANDLER(ff); -static int com_jmp(__a_unused struct command_context *cc, - struct lls_parse_result *lpr) +static int com_jmp(struct command_context *cc, struct lls_parse_result *lpr) { long unsigned int i; int ret; @@ -760,7 +768,7 @@ struct connection_features { int dummy; /* none at the moment */ }; -static int parse_auth_request(char *buf, int len, struct user **u, +static int parse_auth_request(char *buf, int len, const struct user **u, struct connection_features *cf) { int ret; @@ -794,7 +802,7 @@ static int parse_auth_request(char *buf, int len, struct user **u, } } PARA_DEBUG_LOG("received auth request for user %s\n", username); - *u = lookup_user(username); + *u = user_list_lookup(username); ret = 1; out: free_argv(features); @@ -862,26 +870,28 @@ static int run_command(struct command_context *cc, struct iovec *iov) * Whenever para_server accepts an incoming tcp connection on the port it * listens on, it forks and the resulting child calls this function. * - * An RSA-based challenge/response is used to authenticate the peer. It that + * An RSA-based challenge/response is used to authenticate the peer. If the * authentication succeeds, a random session key is generated and sent back to * the peer, encrypted with its RSA public key. From this point on, all - * transfers are crypted with this session key. + * transfers are encrypted with this session key using a stream cipher. * * Next it is checked if the peer supplied a valid server command or a command * for the audio file selector. If yes, and if the user has sufficient - * permissions to execute that command, the function calls the corresponding - * command handler which does argument checking and further processing. + * permissions to execute this command, the function calls the corresponding + * command handler which performs argument checking and further processing. + * + * To cope with DOS attacks, a timer is set up right after the fork. If the + * connection was still not authenticated when the timeout expires, the child + * process is terminated. * - * In order to cope with DOS attacks, a timeout is set up which terminates - * the function if the connection was not authenticated when the timeout - * expires. + * \return Standard. * - * \sa alarm(2), \ref crypt.c, \ref crypt.h. + * \sa alarm(2), \ref openssl.c, \ref crypt.h. */ -__noreturn void handle_connect(int fd) +int handle_connect(int fd) { int ret; - unsigned char rand_buf[CHALLENGE_SIZE + 2 * SESSION_KEY_LEN]; + unsigned char rand_buf[APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE + 2 * SESSION_KEY_LEN]; unsigned char challenge_hash[HASH_SIZE]; char *command = NULL, *buf = para_malloc(HANDSHAKE_BUFSIZE) /* must be on the heap */; size_t numbytes; @@ -911,7 +921,7 @@ __noreturn void handle_connect(int fd) goto net_err; if (cc->u) { get_random_bytes_or_die(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)); - ret = pub_encrypt(cc->u->pubkey, rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf), + ret = apc_pub_encrypt(cc->u->pubkey, rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf), (unsigned char *)buf); if (ret < 0) goto net_err; @@ -926,7 +936,7 @@ __noreturn void handle_connect(int fd) get_random_bytes_or_die((unsigned char *)buf, numbytes); } PARA_DEBUG_LOG("sending %d byte challenge + session key (%zu bytes)\n", - CHALLENGE_SIZE, numbytes); + APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE, numbytes); ret = send_sb(&cc->scc, buf, numbytes, SBD_CHALLENGE, false); buf = NULL; if (ret < 0) @@ -942,21 +952,21 @@ __noreturn void handle_connect(int fd) if (!cc->u) goto net_err; /* - * The correct response is the hash of the first CHALLENGE_SIZE bytes + * The correct response is the hash of the first APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE bytes * of the random data. */ ret = -E_BAD_AUTH; if (numbytes != HASH_SIZE) goto net_err; - hash_function((char *)rand_buf, CHALLENGE_SIZE, challenge_hash); + hash_function((char *)rand_buf, APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE, challenge_hash); if (memcmp(challenge_hash, buf, HASH_SIZE)) goto net_err; /* auth successful */ alarm(0); PARA_INFO_LOG("good auth for %s\n", cc->u->name); /* init stream cipher keys with the second part of the random buffer */ - cc->scc.recv = sc_new(rand_buf + CHALLENGE_SIZE, SESSION_KEY_LEN); - cc->scc.send = sc_new(rand_buf + CHALLENGE_SIZE + SESSION_KEY_LEN, + cc->scc.recv = sc_new(rand_buf + APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE, SESSION_KEY_LEN); + cc->scc.send = sc_new(rand_buf + APC_CHALLENGE_SIZE + SESSION_KEY_LEN, SESSION_KEY_LEN); ret = send_sb(&cc->scc, NULL, 0, SBD_PROCEED, false); if (ret < 0) @@ -988,5 +998,5 @@ out: } sc_free(cc->scc.recv); sc_free(cc->scc.send); - exit(ret < 0? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS); + return ret; }