X-Git-Url: http://git.tuebingen.mpg.de/?p=paraslash.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypt.c;h=f064fb3a535d9df3306818d7e9c27ca85193bd50;hp=73eebe180dbe2c32718b5dc7fd271f7ca4b329b1;hb=e9ac00becb2aba5bbbf51b4803b81b10ed4d6788;hpb=002731cd3938f3be6b71651e56c062af1adcdec0 diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c index 73eebe18..f064fb3a 100644 --- a/crypt.c +++ b/crypt.c @@ -1,21 +1,75 @@ /* - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 Andre Noll + * Copyright (C) 2005-2011 Andre Noll * * Licensed under the GPL v2. For licencing details see COPYING. */ -/** \file crypt.c openssl-based RSA encryption/decryption routines */ +/** \file crypt.c Openssl-based encryption/decryption routines. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include #include "para.h" #include "error.h" #include "string.h" #include "crypt.h" +#include "fd.h" +#include "crypt_backend.h" + +struct asymmetric_key { + RSA *rsa; +}; + +void get_random_bytes_or_die(unsigned char *buf, int num) +{ + unsigned long err; + + /* RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ + if (RAND_bytes(buf, num) == 1) + return; + err = ERR_get_error(); + PARA_EMERG_LOG("%s\n", ERR_reason_error_string(err)); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); +} + +/* + * Read 64 bytes from /dev/urandom and adds them to the SSL PRNG. Seed the PRNG + * used by random() with a random seed obtained from SSL. If /dev/random is not + * readable the function calls exit(). + * + * \sa RAND_load_file(3), \ref get_random_bytes_or_die(), srandom(3), + * random(3), \ref para_random(). + */ +void init_random_seed_or_die(void) +{ + int seed, ret = RAND_load_file("/dev/urandom", 64); + + if (ret != 64) { + PARA_EMERG_LOG("could not seed PRNG (ret = %d)\n", ret); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + get_random_bytes_or_die((unsigned char *)&seed, sizeof(seed)); + srandom(seed); +} static EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int private) { BIO *key; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int ret = check_key_file(file, private); + if (ret < 0) { + PARA_ERROR_LOG("%s\n", para_strerror(-ret)); + return NULL; + } key = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (!key) return NULL; @@ -29,18 +83,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int private) return pkey; } -/** - * read an RSA key from a file - * - * \param key_file the file containing the key - * \param rsa RSA structure is returned here - * \param private if non-zero, read the private key, otherwise the public key - * - * \return The size of the RSA key on success, negative on errors. - * - * \sa openssl(1), rsa(1). - */ -int get_rsa_key(char *key_file, RSA **rsa, int private) +static int get_openssl_key(const char *key_file, RSA **rsa, int private) { EVP_PKEY *key = load_key(key_file, private); @@ -54,119 +97,230 @@ int get_rsa_key(char *key_file, RSA **rsa, int private) return RSA_size(*rsa); } -/** - * free an RSA structure - * - * \param rsa pointer to the RSA struct to free - * - * This must be called for any key obtained by get_rsa_key(). +/* + * The public key loading functions below were inspired by corresponding code + * of openssh-5.2p1, Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, + * Finland. However, not much of the original code remains. */ -void rsa_free(RSA *rsa) + +static int read_bignum(const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BIGNUM **result) { - if (rsa) - RSA_free(rsa); + const unsigned char *p = buf, *end = buf + len; + uint32_t bnsize; + BIGNUM *bn; + + if (p + 4 < p) + return -E_BIGNUM; + if (p + 4 > end) + return -E_BIGNUM; + bnsize = read_ssh_u32(p); + PARA_DEBUG_LOG("bnsize: %u\n", bnsize); + p += 4; + if (p + bnsize < p) + return -E_BIGNUM; + if (p + bnsize > end) + return -E_BIGNUM; + if (bnsize > 8192) + return -E_BIGNUM; + bn = BN_bin2bn(p, bnsize, NULL); + if (!bn) + return -E_BIGNUM; + *result = bn; + return bnsize + 4; } -/** - * decrypt a buffer using an RSA key - * - * \param key_file full path of the rsa key - * \param outbuf the output buffer - * \param inbuf the encrypted input buffer - * \param rsa_inlen the length of \a inbuf - * - * The \a outbuf must be large enough to hold at least \a rsa_inlen bytes. - * - * \return The size of the recovered plaintext on success, negative on errors. - * - * \sa RSA_private_decrypt(3) - **/ -int para_decrypt_buffer(char *key_file, unsigned char *outbuf, unsigned char *inbuf, - unsigned rsa_inlen) +static int read_rsa_bignums(const unsigned char *blob, int blen, RSA **result) { + int ret; RSA *rsa; - int ret, inlen = rsa_inlen; + const unsigned char *p = blob, *end = blob + blen; - if (inlen < 0) - return -E_RSA; - ret = get_rsa_key(key_file, &rsa, LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY); + rsa = RSA_new(); + if (!rsa) + return -E_BIGNUM; + ret = read_bignum(p, end - p, &rsa->e); if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, inbuf, outbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - rsa_free(rsa); - return (ret > 0)? ret : -E_DECRYPT; + goto fail; + p += ret; + ret = read_bignum(p, end - p, &rsa->n); + if (ret < 0) + goto fail; + *result = rsa; + return 1; +fail: + if (rsa) + RSA_free(rsa); + return ret; } -/** - * decrypt the challenge number sent by para_server - * - * \param key_file full path of the rsa key - * \param challenge_nr result is stored here - * \param inbuf the input buffer - * \param rsa_inlen the length of \a inbuf - * - * \return positive on success, negative on errors - * - * \sa para_decrypt_buffer() - */ -int para_decrypt_challenge(char *key_file, long unsigned *challenge_nr, - unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned rsa_inlen) +int get_asymmetric_key(const char *key_file, int private, + struct asymmetric_key **result) { - unsigned char *rsa_out = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_inlen + 1); - int ret = para_decrypt_buffer(key_file, rsa_out, inbuf, rsa_inlen); + struct asymmetric_key *key = NULL; + void *map = NULL; + unsigned char *blob = NULL; + size_t map_size, blob_size, decoded_size; + int ret, ret2; + char *cp; - if (ret >= 0) { - rsa_out[ret] = '\0'; - ret = sscanf((char *)rsa_out, "%lu", challenge_nr) == 1? - 1 : -E_CHALLENGE; + key = para_malloc(sizeof(*key)); + if (private) { + ret = get_openssl_key(key_file, &key->rsa, LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY); + goto out; + } + ret = mmap_full_file(key_file, O_RDONLY, &map, &map_size, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = is_ssh_rsa_key(map, map_size); + if (!ret) { + ret = para_munmap(map, map_size); + map = NULL; + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = get_openssl_key(key_file, &key->rsa, LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY); + goto out; } - OPENSSL_free(rsa_out); + cp = map + ret; + PARA_INFO_LOG("decoding public rsa-ssh key %s\n", key_file); + ret = -ERRNO_TO_PARA_ERROR(EOVERFLOW); + if (map_size > INT_MAX / 4) + goto out; + blob_size = 2 * map_size; + blob = para_malloc(blob_size); + ret = uudecode(cp, blob, blob_size); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + decoded_size = ret; + ret = check_ssh_key_header(blob, decoded_size); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = read_rsa_bignums(blob + ret, decoded_size - ret, &key->rsa); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = RSA_size(key->rsa); +out: + ret2 = para_munmap(map, map_size); + if (ret >= 0 && ret2 < 0) + ret = ret2; + if (ret < 0) { + free(key); + result = NULL; + PARA_ERROR_LOG("key %s: %s\n", key_file, para_strerror(-ret)); + } else + *result = key; + free(blob); return ret; } -/** - * encrypt a buffer using an RSA key - * - * \param rsa: public rsa key - * \param inbuf the input buffer - * \param len the length of \a inbuf - * \param outbuf the output buffer - * - * \return The size of the encrypted data on success, negative on errors - * - * \sa RSA_public_encrypt(3) - */ -int para_encrypt_buffer(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *inbuf, +void free_asymmetric_key(struct asymmetric_key *key) +{ + if (!key) + return; + RSA_free(key->rsa); + free(key); +} + +int priv_decrypt(const char *key_file, unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned char *inbuf, int inlen) +{ + struct asymmetric_key *priv; + int ret; + + if (inlen < 0) + return -E_RSA; + ret = get_asymmetric_key(key_file, LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY, &priv); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + /* + * RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. Generate a random blinding + * factor to protect against this kind of attack. + */ + ret = -E_BLINDING; + if (RSA_blinding_on(priv->rsa, NULL) == 0) + goto out; + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, inbuf, outbuf, priv->rsa, + RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); + RSA_blinding_off(priv->rsa); + if (ret <= 0) + ret = -E_DECRYPT; +out: + free_asymmetric_key(priv); + return ret; +} + +int pub_encrypt(struct asymmetric_key *pub, unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned len, unsigned char *outbuf) { int ret, flen = len; /* RSA_public_encrypt expects a signed int */ if (flen < 0) return -E_ENCRYPT; - ret = RSA_public_encrypt(flen, inbuf, outbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - return ret < 0? -E_ENCRYPT : ret; + ret = RSA_public_encrypt(flen, inbuf, outbuf, pub->rsa, + RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); + return ret < 0? -E_ENCRYPT : ret; +} + +struct stream_cipher { + RC4_KEY key; +}; + +struct stream_cipher *sc_new(const unsigned char *data, int len) +{ + struct stream_cipher *sc = para_malloc(sizeof(*sc)); + RC4_set_key(&sc->key, len, data); + return sc; +} + +void sc_free(struct stream_cipher *sc) +{ + free(sc); } /** - * encrypt the given challenge number - * - * \param rsa: public rsa key - * \param challenge_nr the number to be encrypted - * \param outbuf the output buffer - * - * \a outbuf must be at least 64 bytes long - * - * \return The size of the encrypted data on success, negative on errors - * - * \sa para_encrypt_buffer() - * + * The RC4() implementation of openssl apparently reads and writes data in + * blocks of 8 bytes. So we have to make sure our buffer sizes are a multiple + * of this. */ -int para_encrypt_challenge(RSA* rsa, long unsigned challenge_nr, - unsigned char *outbuf) +#define RC4_ALIGN 8 + +int sc_send_bin_buffer(struct stream_cipher_context *scc, char *buf, + size_t len) { - unsigned char *inbuf = (unsigned char*) make_message("%lu", challenge_nr); - int ret = para_encrypt_buffer(rsa, inbuf, strlen((char *)inbuf), outbuf); - free(inbuf); + int ret; + unsigned char *tmp; + static unsigned char remainder[RC4_ALIGN]; + size_t l1 = ROUND_DOWN(len, RC4_ALIGN), l2 = ROUND_UP(len, RC4_ALIGN); + + assert(len); + tmp = para_malloc(l2); + RC4(&scc->send->key, l1, (const unsigned char *)buf, tmp); + if (len > l1) { + memcpy(remainder, buf + l1, len - l1); + RC4(&scc->send->key, len - l1, remainder, tmp + l1); + } + ret = write_all(scc->fd, (char *)tmp, &len); + free(tmp); return ret; } +int sc_recv_bin_buffer(struct stream_cipher_context *scc, char *buf, + size_t size) +{ + unsigned char *tmp = para_malloc(size); + ssize_t ret = recv(scc->fd, tmp, size, 0); + + if (ret > 0) + RC4(&scc->recv->key, ret, tmp, (unsigned char *)buf); + else if (ret < 0) + ret = -ERRNO_TO_PARA_ERROR(errno); + free(tmp); + return ret; +} + +void hash_function(const char *data, unsigned long len, unsigned char *hash) +{ + SHA_CTX c; + SHA1_Init(&c); + SHA1_Update(&c, data, len); + SHA1_Final(hash, &c); +}